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Oversold, Delayed, Rescheduled: Airline Passenger 
Rights and Protections 
Matthew Schoonover  
INTRODUCTION 
Flying was a very tangible freedom . . . . 
[I]t was beauty, adventure, discovery . . . . 
—Anne Morrow Lindbergh1 
The freedom of flight was an elusive dream for the forty-seven 
passengers on Continental Express Flight 2816.
2
 They were captives, 
waiting to deplane or depart for their final destination.
3
 Weather had 
diverted the fifty-seat aircraft,
4
 originally scheduled to fly two-and-a-
 
  J.D. (2011), Washington University School of Law; Flight Attendant, GoJet Airlines 
(2006–2008); B.A. History, Video Production (2006), Webster University. Thank you to my 
mother, Diann Schoonover, and my brother, Christopher Schoonover, for their support on this 
Note and throughout all areas of my life. I appreciate the work of Editor-in-Chief Laura 
Johannes, Executive Notes and Projects Editors Kate Lewis and Jane Kim, Primary Editor 
Katherine Straw, and the rest of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy staff, 
whose editing skills transformed a rough draft into a finished paper. This Note is dedicated to 
my father, grandfather, and airline colleagues for sharing their love of aviation. 
 1. ANNE MORROW LINDBERGH, HOUR OF GOLD, HOUR OF LEAD: DIARIES AND LETTERS 
OF ANNE MORROW LINDBERGH, 1929–1932, at 4 (1973). Morrow, a pioneering aviator, later 
married the famous transatlantic pilot, Charles Lindbergh. Id. at 6. 
 2. Continental contracted the operation of Flight 2816 to ExpressJet Airlines. Nomaan 
Merchant, Passengers Kept on Plane for Hours, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2009, at A03. Flight 
2816 was regularly scheduled to depart Houston at 9:20 p.m. and arrive in Minneapolis at 11:51 
p.m. ExpressJet Airlines # 2816, FLIGHTAWARE, http://flightaware.com/live/flight/BTA2816 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2009) (on file with author). 
 3. Merchant, supra note 2. Passengers later complained that the crew did not keep them 
honestly informed about the flight‘s status. Id. 
 4. ExpressJet operates only two models of the Embraer ERJ-145 jet aircraft, each 
configured to carry fifty passengers. Fleet Information, EXPRESSJET, http://www.expressjet. 
com/about/fleet.htm (last visited Nov. 2009). A commercial configuration of the ERJ-145 seats 
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half hours nonstop from Houston to Minneapolis.
5
 Five hours after a 
midnight landing in Rochester, Minnesota, the passengers longed for 
the terminal a mere fifty yards away.
6
 Snacks and drinks ran low.
7
 
The single lavatory overfilled.
8
 Two screaming babies kept everyone 
awake.
9
 The passengers had been trapped for over eight hours on an 
airplane designed for short, regional flights.
10
  
At 5:00 a.m., Flight 2816 received clearance to complete its trip,
11
 
but the crew had reached its duty limit and was required to rest.
12
 Still 
in Rochester, the passengers were permitted to deplane at 6:00 a.m., 
waiting in the terminal before reboarding with a new crew.
13
 Finally, 
at 9:15 a.m., almost twelve hours after departing Houston, the 
passengers of Flight 2816 arrived in Minneapolis.
14
 
 
three passengers in each row with a narrow aisle separating one seat from the other two. See 
EMBRAER, ERJ-145 FAMILY: BUILDING REGIONAL AIRLINE SUCCESS 12–13, 19 (2005), 
available at http://www.embraercommercialjets.com.cn/content/erj/doc/Brochure_145Family. 
pdf. 
 5. Merchant, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Editorial, But They Were Next in Line for Takeoff, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at 
A18. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.; Merchant, supra note 2. 
 10. The ERJ-145 has a range of 1,550 nautical miles, and the ERJ-145 XR has a range of 
2,000 nautical miles. EMBRAER, supra note 4, at 3, 7. Neither model is capable of crossing the 
entire United States. Id. at 3, 9. 
 11. Merchant, supra note 2.  
 12. Id. Duty limits establish the maximum duration crew members may consecutively 
work. DREW WHITELEGG, WORKING THE SKIES: THE FAST-PACED, DISORIENTING WORLD OF 
THE FLIGHT ATTENDANT 120–21 (2007). Pilots have a scheduled duty limit of eight hours. 
Flight Time Limitations: One or Two Pilot Crews, 14 C.F.R. § 121.481 (2009). Flight 
Attendants have a scheduled duty limit of fourteen hours. Flight Attendant Duty Period 
Limitations and Rest Requirements, 14 C.F.R. § 121.467 (2009). Rest requirements, closely 
related to duty limits, prevent work periods from occurring too close together even when delays 
cause a crew to arrive late to its layover. WHITELEGG, supra, at 121–22. 
 13. ExpressJet said the delay resulted from the airport‘s lack of late-night security 
screeners. Merchant, supra note 2. The airport manager stated that ―[t]his [was] not an airport 
issue‖ but rather ―an airline issue,‖ asserting that Flight 2816 passengers could have waited in a 
secure area within the terminal. Id. (quoting Steven Leqve).  
 14. Id. The DOT assessed $50,000 in penalties against Continental and ExpressJet for 
their involvement in stranding the passengers of Flight 2816, which violated ―the prohibitions 
against unfair and deceptive practices in air transportation contained in 49 U.S.C. § 41712.‖ 
ExpressJet Airlines, Inc., OST 2009-0001-0031 (Dep‘t of Transp. Nov. 24, 2009) (consent 
order), available at http://regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2009-0001-0031; 
Continental Airlines, Inc., OST 2009-0001-0030-0030 (Dep‘t of Transp. Nov. 24, 2009) 
(consent order), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Oversold, Delayed, Rescheduled 521 
 
 
Most of the flying public has experienced the frustrations of 
modern travel. Passengers suffer from delays, poor service, and 
overbooked flights. These conditions are partially the result of 
airlines competing for lower fares and their overuse of limited airport 
space.
15
 
In response, the Department of Transportation (DOT) published a 
new regulation to limit the effects of delays and require services 
when passengers are stranded on domestic flights.
16
 Beginning in 
April 2010, all airlines must create a delay contingency plan and, 
when delays exceed two hours, provide passengers with food and 
beverages.
17
 Lavatories must flush and be sanitary.
18
 Most 
significantly, the regulation requires that passengers be deplaned 
when a delay exceeds three hours.
19
 The DOT will penalize airlines 
for trapping passengers on planes beyond the three-hour limit.
20
 
The Senate and House of Representatives also began considering 
the Airline Passenger Bill of Rights Act of 2009 (APBR).
21
 If 
enacted, the APBR would mandate that airlines develop plans to 
prevent a recurrence of situations like Flight 2816.
22
 Carriers would 
be forced to provide nourishment, lavatory facilities, and the 
opportunity to deplane for passengers stranded on aircraft.
23
 The 
APBR would also require airports to supply gates to deplane 
passengers during long ground delays.
24
 
However, the DOT regulation and proposed APBR address only 
some of the effects of delays
25
 and fail to impose similar restrictions 
 
2009-0001-0030. The ground operations provider in Rochester was fined $75,000. Mesaba 
Airlines, OST 2009-0001-0029 (Dep‘t of Transp. Nov. 24, 2009) (consent order), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2009-0001-0029. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. See Enhanced Protections for Airline Passengers, 14 C.F.R. § 259 (2010). 
 17. Id. § 259.4. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. However, there are exceptions for security or safety-related reasons, or if returning 
to the gate or another disembarkation point would cause significant disruption. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. S. 213, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 624, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 22. S. 213. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra Part I.D. 
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on international flights and foreign carriers.
26
 Factors that cause 
delays, like scheduling, maintenance, and hub selection, also should 
be governed.
27
 In addition, the deplaning requirements of the DOT 
regulation and APBR actually could increase delays for displaced 
passengers.
28
 Stranded aircraft will compete for already overcrowded 
ramp spaces, requiring careful orchestration of gate availability.
29
 
Reboarding delayed flights will take additional time, and more 
passengers may find cancellations as airlines, conscious of new 
penalties, become cautious of postponing flights.
30
 
Legislation is needed to guarantee the protections of the new DOT 
regulation and to impose realistic requirements on airlines and 
airports.
31
 Subsequent statutes and regulations should limit the 
number of departures and arrivals scheduled by airlines and 
airports.
32
 In response to these restrictions, airlines must reduce 
flights, at least during peak periods.
33
 
Statutes and regulations should standardize procedures for the 
airline industry. Penalties for failing to comply with deplaning 
requirements should be uniform to encourage compliance, reflect 
airline revenues, and provide passengers with a cause of action.
34
 
Reasonable regulations and penalties need to be applied to all airlines 
 
 26. Enhanced Protections for Airline Passengers, 14 C.F.R. §§ 259.3–259.4 (2010). The 
delay of Virgin Atlantic Flight VS001 from London to New York revealed the limitations of the 
new regulation. Joe Sharkey, Despite New Rules, Stranded on the Tarmac, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2010, at B6. Less than two months after the DOT regulation took effect, Flight VS001 was 
diverted to Connecticut‘s Bradley International Airport where its three hundred passengers 
suffered in the heat for approximately four hours before deplaning. Id. The aircraft lost power, 
passengers sweated, and some customers yelled at the flight attendants, ―You‘re treating us like 
animals.‖ Id. (quoting Russell F. Homasi). Virgin Atlantic blamed the delay on a lack of 
customs officials staffing the airport. Thomas Frank, Virgin Blames Customs for Delay: Airline 
Says Official Denied Passengers’ Exit, USA TODAY, June 25, 2010, at 3A. The last passenger 
made it through customs nine hours after landing in Connecticut. See id. Flight VS001 occurred 
after the DOT regulation took effect, but its international status meant no deplaning limit 
applied. See id. 
 27. See infra Part I.B.  
 28. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 86, 144 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 146, 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 32. New laws and regulations should build on existing slot controls. See infra notes 53–55 
and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
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and flights operating within the United States, regardless of 
international status.
35
 At the same time, flexibility must exist for 
diverse situations.
36
 The minimum service standards during tarmac 
delays should accommodate various airplane sizes and their 
respective capacities to provide for passengers.
37
 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of aviation regulation and 
subsequent deregulation, reasons for delays, and the rising concern 
for passenger rights. Part II critiques and analyzes the potential 
effectiveness of the new DOT regulation and the APBR of 2009. Part 
III proposes regulations and legislation that will prevent economic 
disruption of the industry while protecting passengers from delay 
abuses. 
I. HISTORY 
A. Regulation and Deregulation of the Airline Industry 
The current protections for airline passenger rights follow from a 
long history of regulating the aviation industry. In 1938, Congress 
established the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
38
 beginning the 
regulatory era that would survive until the late 1970s.
39
 Using its 
power, the CAB limited economic competition by requiring airlines 
to fly complementary routes, with each carrier connecting different 
portions of the country.
40
 The CAB later set fares to ensure industry 
profitability.
41
 
 
 35. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 83, 133 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 38. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 201, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed 1978). The CAB 
had authority to determine carrier routes, control entry into the marketplace, and regulate fares. 
Id. §§ 401, 404. The CAB‘s power initially extended to safety regulations. Id. § 601. The 
Board, however, never had authority over the schedules or the types of airplanes carriers flew 
on various routes. ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, DAVID R. GRAHAM & DANIEL P. KAPLAN, 
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 12 (1985).  
 39. Regulation under the CAB was phased out between 1978 and 1983. BAILEY ET AL., 
supra note 38, at 3, 34. 
 40. Id. at 13. The CAB continued the route system developed during the Hoover 
administration, periodically granting route extensions and approving mergers. Id. at 11–12. 
During the 1920s, ―the predecessors of American, TWA, and United‖ were granted 
―transcontinental mail contract authority over parallel routes.‖ Id. at 11. Eastern Airlines was 
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Under the CAB, established carriers were prevented from 
expanding into markets served by competitors.
42
 New airlines found 
an even greater challenge in gaining approval for market entry.
43
 The 
CAB‘s focus on noncompeting routes inflated fares above operating 
costs, a disparity that grew as new aviation technologies increased 
efficiency.
44
 Rather than price competition, airlines attracted 
passengers by offering more frequent flights and unique inflight 
services.
45
 
Only airlines that crossed state borders or international waters 
flew under the CAB‘s control.46 Intrastate carriers developed outside 
 
made ―the north-south carrier on the East Coast and United [was] the north-south carrier on the 
West Coast.‖ Id. 
 41. Id. at 16. 
 42. Id. at 13. 
 43. Id. The policies governing market entry were so strict that ―between 1938 and 1977, 
the CAB permitted no entry at all into city-pair markets that already had two or more carriers.‖ 
PAT HANLON, GLOBAL AIRLINES: COMPETITION IN A TRANSNATIONAL INDUSTRY 71 (3d ed. 
2008). 
 44. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 17. Airplanes introduced after the Second World War 
were capable of holding more passengers, traveling faster, and operating at lower costs than 
prewar aircraft. Id. The fare discrepancies did not lead to a change in the price of the standard 
first-class ticket, but the major carriers did introduce the precursor to economy class fares in the 
1950s. Id. Costs to airlines were further reduced with the widespread introduction of efficient 
jet service in the late 1950s. Id. 
 45. Id. at 18. On longer flights, costs were far below the CAB‘s fares and ―carriers 
provided more frequent service and lower load factors than consumers wished.‖ Id. Excess 
flights were less common in short-haul markets where the airlines‘ costs often exceeded the 
permitted fares. Id.; see also WHITELEGG, supra note 12, at 46. Passengers enjoyed signature 
meals and comfortable cabins, foreign concepts to today‘s travelers, who are squeezed into 
economy class seats. See BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 18. Airplanes were equipped with 
entertainment areas, using the social aspects of flying to attract travelers. See JOHANNA OMELIA 
& MICHAEL WALDOCK, COME FLY WITH US! A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE HOSTESS 
112 (2006) (reprinting photograph of economy cabin on American Airlines with a piano 
lounge); see also id. at 86 (reprinting photograph of passengers on United Airlines playing at a 
card table).  
 The distinction between carriers‘ services was most pronounced through the brand identity 
associated with each airline‘s flight attendants. WHITELEGG, supra note 12, at 40. Attendants 
began as flying nurses to calm passenger fears, but this purpose quickly gave way to the image 
of ―perfect wives and mothers‖ in the air. Id. at 34, 41. Delta marketed the southern belle while 
United promoted its Midwestern roots through the women it hired. Id. at 42–43. The 1960s saw 
the advent of flight attendants as sex symbols. Id. at 45–46. For example, TWA passengers 
were met with staff dressed in mini outfits to bring the flair of international travel to 
transcontinental routes. See OMELIA & WALDOCK, supra, at 106 (reprinting TWA 
advertisement). 
 46. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1, 52 Stat. 973 (repealed 1978) (using 
definition of ―[a]ir commerce‖ to narrow statute). 
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of the regulatory authority, offering lower fares than those allowed 
for major airlines.
47
 In heavily traversed states like California, small 
airlines undercut major carriers on profitable routes such as the one 
from San Francisco to Los Angeles.
48
 Responding to the lower fares, 
passenger traffic on that particular route grew 117 percent from 1960 
to 1965.
49
 
In 1958, Congress formed the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)
50
 to separate safety and development regulations from the 
economic concerns administered under the CAB.
51
 The FAA was 
given responsibility for controlling the rising aircraft traffic 
problems.
52
 By 1969, five major airports had become so congested 
that the agency imposed high density rule (HDR) slot controls.
53
 Slot 
controls divide an airport‘s schedule into increments, enabling the 
FAA to regulate the number of airplanes scheduled to depart or arrive 
within a given time period.
54
 The controls also govern the division of 
airport slots between carriers.
55
  
 
 47. HANLON, supra note 43, at 71. The most successful of these intrastate airlines, 
Southwest, was initially formed to serve the Texas markets. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 
28. 
 48. HANLON, supra note 43, at 71. Intrastate carriers, like Pacific Southwest Airlines, 
were able to offer fares at less than half the rate of airlines operating under the CAB. BAILEY ET 
AL., supra note 38, at 27. To compete, major airlines pressured the CAB into permitting 
reduced fares for flights within a single state, but the intrastate carriers continued to out-perform 
their larger counterparts because the CAB required the cheaper tickets be purchased within the 
state of travel. Id. at 28. 
 49. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 28. As a comparison to the CAB regulated market, 
the passenger traffic on the intrastate route between Dallas and Houston grew 127.5 percent 
from 1970 to 1974; similar routes under the CAB increased traffic by only 9.8 percent during 
the same period. Id. at 28–29 (comparing high density routes like Chicago to St. Louis). 
 50. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (current version at 49 
U.S.C. § 40101 (2000)). 
 51. The stated purpose of the FAA was ―to best foster [civil aviation‘s] development and 
safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the airspace by both civil and military 
aircraft, and for other purposes.‖ Id. 
 52. Id. §§ 307, 312. 
 53. High Density Traffic Airports, 14 C.F.R. § 93.123 (2009). HDR controls were 
established at Chicago O‘Hare, Washington National, Newark, La Guardia, and Kennedy 
International. Id. HDRs, like the CAB regulations, excluded new entrants to the busiest airports 
with the most profitable routes. GEORGE L. DONOHUE, RUSSELL D. SHAVER III & ERIC 
EDWARDS, TERMINAL CHAOS: WHY U.S. AIR TRAVEL IS BROKEN AND HOW TO FIX IT 46 
(2008). 
 54. AIRPORT SLOTS: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 44 
(Achim I. Czerny et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter AIRPORT SLOTS]. Each airport governed by slot 
controls is granted a maximum number of flights it may handle in a given period. 14 C.F.R. 
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Reassigning safety regulations to the FAA was only the beginning 
of changes made to CAB control. Recognizing the substantial 
differences in ticket prices between unregulated intrastate carriers and 
regulated interstate airlines, the CAB and Congress favored reform.
56
 
Economy carriers viewed deregulation as a way to gain routes 
previously reserved for the regulated airlines.
57
 Most major carriers, 
however, opposed the prospect of fare competition in the financially 
troubled world of the 1970s.
58
 The CAB determined these concerns 
were unwarranted and responded with self-deregulation, reducing 
fare restrictions and barriers to market entry.
59
 A subsequent rise in 
airline profits relaxed industry resistance to deregulation and created 
an environment that invited reform.
60
 
 
§ 93.123. For example, Chicago O‘Hare can handle eighty departures and arrivals every thirty 
minutes. Id. The slots are divided into specific categories: sixty-two for airlines, thirteen for 
commuters, and five designated as ―other.‖ Id. Similar slot allocations developed by the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) are used in other countries. AIRPORT SLOTS, 
supra, at 9. In addition to the broader use of IATA recommendations, the IATA allows airlines 
to actively participate in slot allocation, whereas the FAA does not. Id. at 42–47. Under IATA, 
―[e]ach airline submits its desired schedule to [a coordinator who] then allocate[s] slots.‖ Id. at 
43. Airlines may trade slots with the coordinator‘s approval. Id. The pricing system model, an 
alternative to slot controls, limits the number of flights by raising costs during peak periods. Id. 
at 1. Airports operating under a pricing system raise fees to decrease flights and lower fees to 
attract more flights. See id. 
 55. AIRPORT SLOTS, supra note 54, at 48. In 2004, American Airlines was limited to 505 
scheduled departures and arrivals between 1:00 p.m. and 7:59 p.m at Chicago O‘Hare. Id. 
United was permitted 655 scheduled operations during the same time period. Id. Together, 
American and United accounted for approximately 88 percent of all scheduled services at the 
dual hub airport. Id. 
 56. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 29, 32. In 1975, the Kennedy hearings investigated 
the pricing differences between interstate and intrastate carriers, concluding that low loads 
caused major airlines to keep fares high. Id. at 31. The commission eased fears that deregulation 
would bankrupt less-competitive carriers. Id. At the same time, the CAB leadership published a 
report favoring complete deregulation as opposed to reform. Id. at 32; HANLON, supra note 43, 
at 71. Economists determined that CAB policies set costs equal to fares rather than regulation‘s 
intended result of setting fares equal to costs. GEORGE W. DOUGLAS & JAMES C. MILLER III, 
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974). 
 57. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 32. Smaller airlines also sought to obtain larger 
planes that the CAB restricted to major carriers. Id. Even earlier, United Airlines favored 
reform to obtain new routes and capital for growth. Id. at 33. As a result of United‘s support, 
the airline industry did not testify in opposition to reform. Id. 
 58. Id. at 32.  
 59. Id. at 33. The CAB‘s first step toward deregulation occurred with the approval of 
discount fare proposals and relaxation of charter operations. Id. 
 60. Id. at 34. Despite reduced fares, profit was driven by expansion of passenger traffic at 
rates not seen since the 1960s. Id. 
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Congress then passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
(ADA),
61
 which phased out the CAB‘s regulatory authority.62 In its 
place, statutory guidelines imposed limitations on pricing, routes, and 
market entry.
63
 The Department of Transportation also took control 
of international and small community air service.
64
 In the post-CAB 
era, the need for slot controls grew as airlines took advantage of new 
route opportunities.
65
 Carriers developed connections through 
expanded airport hubs, permitting easy travel to and from spokes.
66
 
This marked a shift from the regulated era when routes were 
commonly based on grids that linked several airports without primary 
connection centers.
67
 
B. Delays 
The concentration of flights operating at modern hub airports 
multiplies the effects associated with delays.
68
 Hubs require the 
prompt arrival of large numbers of airplanes in short time periods 
known as ―waves.‖69 Late arrivals in the morning cause ripple delays 
 
 61. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (amending 
various portions of 49 U.S.C. § 1301). The ADA was designed ―to encourage, develop, and 
attain an air transportation system which relies on competitive market forces to determine the 
quality, variety, and price of air services.‖ Id. at 1705. 
 62. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 34. The CAB relaxation opened almost all routes to 
new entrants within a year of the ADA‘s passage. Id. at 36. 
 63. § 33, 92 Stat. 1705. 
 64. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 34. 
 65. Id. at 74. 
 66. Id. at 75. An airport hub is a concentration point for a carrier where passengers arrive 
from their originating locations, change planes, and depart for their final destinations. HANLON, 
supra note 43, at 126. ―Air carriers normally assign large capacity non-stop flights between 
their hubs.‖ MASSOUD BAZARGAN, AIRLINE OPERATIONS AND SCHEDULING 32 (2004). For 
most passengers, spokes serve as the originating and final destinations. See generally HANLON, 
supra note 43, at 126. Carriers assign smaller aircraft, often operated by regional airlines, to 
hub-and-spoke flights. BAZARGAN, supra, at 32. 
 67. HANLON, supra note 43, at 124–25. Hub-and-spoke operations offer the advantages of 
―higher revenues, higher efficiency, and lower number of aircraft needed as compared to‖ other 
networks. BAZARGAN, supra note 66, at 32. As airlines have combined operations, the new, 
larger carriers discontinue smaller hub operations and consolidate connections at busier 
airports. See Robert Schoenberger, Does St. Louis’ Loss of Hub Hold Lessons for Cleveland?, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 11, 2010, at A1. For example, American Airlines transferred 
former TWA flights from St. Louis to its larger hub airports. Id. 
 68. See HANLON, supra note 43, at 231. 
 69. See id. at 183. Waves are created by scheduling flights at the spokes ―so that they 
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because the same aircraft and crews are needed for subsequent 
flights.
70
 Delays in the hub system also affect spokes, as departures 
from hub airports cause passengers to arrive late at their final 
destinations. Despite concerns about delays, however, airlines and 
airports consistently operate more than 70 percent of flights on 
time.
71
  
The majority of delays are beyond the carriers‘ control. Weather 
alone accounts for almost half of all delays.
72
 Extreme weather delays 
result when conditions prevent all flight operations.
73
 Weather also 
can affect the entire National Aviation System, contributing to delays 
across the country.
74
 Although a city‘s weather is an important 
operating factor, selection of hub locations only partially considers 
the delay risks at connection centers.
75
  
Even clear skies do not guarantee timely flights, as delays have 
become unavoidable in the safety-conscious environment of modern 
travel. Despite media attention in the wake of September 11, 2001, 
 
connect at the hubs, arrivals preceding departures in sufficient time to permit the transfer of 
baggage [and passengers] from inbound to outbound flights.‖ Id.  
 70. In 2009, 6.12 percent of flights at major airports suffered delays due to late arrivals. 
Research & Innovative Tech. Admin., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Flight Delays by Cause: All 
Major Airports (January–December, 2009), BTS.GOV, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/OT_Delay/ 
OT_DelayCause1.asp?type=21&pn=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) [hereinafter BTS, January–
December, 2009] (select ―All Major airports,‖ ―January, 2009,‖ and ―December, 2009‖ from 
the drop-down menus at the top of the webpage and click ―submit‖). Once delayed, passengers 
flying on the aircraft later in the day may miss their connections unless the crews can get back 
on schedule. See BAZARGAN, supra note 66, at 141 (showing tightly scheduled arrival and 
departure times). In addition to delays, airlines can also use ―flight cancellations, aircraft 
substitutions, ferry flights (flying an empty aircraft to a point of need) and aircraft diversions to 
return to their published scheduled flights as soon as possible.‖ Id. at 140. 
 71. Research & Innovative Tech. Admin., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Flight Delays by 
Cause: All Major Airports (June, 2003–December, 2009), BTS.GOV, http://www.transtats.bts. 
gov/OT_DelayCause1.asp?pn=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (select ―All Major airports,‖ ―June, 
2003,‖ and ―December, 2009‖ from the drop-down menus at the top of the webpage and click 
―submit‖) (between June 2003 and December 2009, 76.37 percent of flights operated on time). 
 72. Research & Innovative Tech. Admin., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Understanding the 
Reporting of Causes of Flight Delays and Cancellations, BTS.GOV, http://www.bts.gov/ 
help/aviation/html/understanding.html#q4 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) [hereinafter BTS, 
Understanding the Reporting] (in 2009, weather accounted for over 44 percent of all delays). 
 73. Id. (indicating that, in 2009, extreme weather accounted for 5 percent of flight delays). 
 74. Id. In 2009, 65.7 percent of all National Aviation System delays were weather related. 
Id. The remainder of the system delays were caused by airport operations, heavy traffic, and air 
traffic control. Id. 
 75. A variety of factors, including proximity to spoke airports and passenger capacity, 
determine where an airline places its hubs. See BAZARGAN, supra note 66, at 22, 132. 
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heightened security actually causes minimal disruptions.
76
 
Maintenance delays are more commonly to blame,
77
 as safety 
concerns have caused the FAA to impose strict regulations and 
minimum equipment lists that prevent departure for even minor 
mechanical problems.
78
 In addition, a lack of readily available 
replacement aircraft at spoke airports requires flights to wait for 
qualified mechanics and parts to be flown from maintenance 
headquarters.
79
 
Airline scheduling techniques exacerbate and even cause delays. 
Despite slot controls, the limitations of airport capacities are stretched 
by carriers attempting to schedule tight departure and arrival waves in 
what are collectively known as ―complexes.‖80 The close connection 
times mean that even short delays result in missed flights. Airlines 
utilizing a hub and spoke system can maximize possible connections 
and decrease passenger layover times by concentrating the largest 
number of flights in the fewest number of complexes.
81
 Carriers use 
regional jets to increase city-pair connections in each complex, 
exchanging one high-capacity flight with multiple trips on smaller 
aircraft.
82
 More flights, however, stress already crowded airports, 
 
 76. See BTS, January–December, 2009, supra note 70 (reporting that, in 2009, only 0.03 
percent of flights were delayed due to security concerns).  
 77. BTS, Understanding the Reporting, supra note 72. Airlines report mechanical delays 
as part of the broader category of air carrier delays, which accounted for 28 percent of delays in 
2009. Id. 
 78. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DEP‘T OF TRANSP., MASTER MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST 
(2008), available at http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/mmel/emb-145%20r13pt91.pdf [hereinafter 
MMEL]. A broken waste container door, with the fire hazard of loose garbage, can lead to 
delays and flight cancellation unless certain conditions are met. Id. at 25-12. The airplane may 
fly with an inoperative waste door if ―[t]he container is empty and the access is secured to 
prevent waste introduction‖ and there are ―sufficient galley waste receptacles . . . to 
accommodate all waste that may be generated on a flight.‖ Id. 
 79. See HANLON, supra note 43, at 187. 
 80. Id. at 138–39. At its Atlanta hub, Delta operates ninety-minute complexes that each 
connect up to 2,500 city-pair linkages. Id. at 139. 
 81. Id. at 184. 
 82. Id. at 155. Expanding in the late 1990s, major carriers have turned to agreements with 
regional airlines operating small jets to connect many smaller spokes to hub airports. Id. Such 
agreements often take the form of franchises, where the regional carrier offers the brand identity 
of the major airline in the form of flight numbers and airplane livery. Id. The relatively low 
operating costs of regional jets justifies their replacement of large airplane service to smaller 
spokes. See EMBRAER, supra note 4, at 4–6. The shift of major airline flights to regional jets is 
most evident in the increase in average miles the smaller airplanes travel per flight, from 274 
miles in 1999 to 461 miles in 2008. 10-Year Industry Statistics, REG‘L AIRLINE ASS‘N, http:// 
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with smaller aircraft that are not as equipped as larger ones to handle 
delays.
83
  
Scheduling conflicts are most apparent when they compound 
existing delays, particularly those affecting an entire airport. Bad 
weather like ice and snow can cause waves of departures to clog 
taxiways.
84
 Flights often wait in lines to be de-iced.
85
 Once airport 
volume is restored, the backlogged flights can take hours to depart.
86
 
Some tarmac delays ultimately culminate in the cancellation of 
flights, adding frustration as the affected passengers already have 
suffered confinement before being stranded in their originating or 
connecting city.
87
  
Delayed flights are inconvenient for passengers and cause 
significant financial loss for airlines, shippers, and the traveling 
public.
88
 Lengthy tarmac delays also require travelers to remain 
 
www.raa.org/images/Portals/0/IndustryStats/10industrytrafficstats.png (last visited May 12, 
2011). 
 83. See EMBRAER, supra note 4, at 6. Regional jets are designed for short flights and light 
passenger loads. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. They generally have tight seating 
arrangements, a single lavatory, and are served by one or two flight attendants. See EMBRAER, 
supra note 4, at 14–15; see also 14 C.F.R. § 121.391 (2009). Larger airplanes like the 
domestically configured Boeing 777 offer multiple classes of service, have several lavatories, 
and transport in excess of three hundred passengers for great distances. B777-200, UNITED, 
http://www.united.com/page/article/0,6867,50977,00.html (last visited May 12, 2011). Such 
airplanes also come in a less crowded, international version that provides an even greater ability 
to endure delays. Id. 
 84. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 85. See E-mail from Ricks Frazier, Assistant Gen. Counsel, United Airlines, Inc., to 
Livaughn Chapman, Trial Att‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of Transp. (June 11, 2008, 8:21 PM), available at 
http://www.airlineinfo.com/sites/DailyAirline/web-content/ostpdf/826.pdf. Passengers on 
United Airlines‘ Flight UA29 experienced a delay that was so long that it required two de-icing 
procedures before departure. Id. The passengers and crew experienced additional delays while 
waiting for a gate to become available. Id. The airplane was then directed to the rear of the 
departure line. Id.  
 86. To prevent a backlog of flights from clogging tarmacs, airports institute the Ground 
Delay Program (GDP). Ground Delay Program, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.fly.faa. 
gov/Products/AIS_ORIGINAL/shortmessage.html (last visited May 12, 2011). The GDP alerts 
aircraft to hold before departure because their destination airport has exceeded its acceptance 
rate. Id. Airports, however, are still stretched beyond gate capacity. Gary Stoller, Fliers 
Trapped on Tarmac Push for Rules on Release, Congress Looks at Laws to Let Travelers Off 
Delayed Flights, USA TODAY, July 28, 2009, at 6A.  
 87. The tarmac may be so full of delayed flights that aircraft have trouble returning to the 
gates. Stoller, supra note 86. 
 88. ―A flight is considered delayed when it arrive[s] 15 or more minutes‖ behind 
schedule. See BTS, January–December, 2009, supra note 70. Domestic flight delays in 2007 
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uncomfortably seated, posing health dangers.
89
 Passengers delayed 
inside the terminal remain comparably free, but the DOT warns 
travelers that ―[e]ach airline has its own policies about what it will do 
for delayed passengers waiting at the airport; there are no federal 
requirements.‖90  
 
are estimated to have ―cost as much as $41 billion to the U.S. economy.‖ DOT and FAA Actions 
Will Likely Have a Limited Effect on Reducing Delays During Summer 2008 Travel Season: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement 
of Susan Fleming, Dir. of Physical Infrastructure Issues). 
 89. See Merchant, supra note 2. One of the more serious health risks passengers face is 
deep vein thrombosis, a potentially deadly clot caused when blood flow slows in the legs after 
sitting for prolonged periods. Rob Lovitt, Double Trouble: DVT a Small, but Serious Risk, 
MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19794895 (last updated July 17, 2007). 
 90. Fly-Rights: A Consumer Guide to Air Travel, AVIATION CONSUMER PROT. DIV., 
DEP‘T OF TRANSP., http://airconsumer.dot.gov/publications/flyrights.htm#delayed (last visited 
May 12, 2011) [hereinafter Fly-Rights]. Travelers are additionally cautioned that some carriers 
―do not provide any amenities to stranded passengers‖ while others only assist when the delay 
was the airline‘s fault. Id. An exception to the general lack of protection is made for individuals 
bumped from flights. Id. Passengers are bumped because airlines overbook flights to 
compensate for those who do not show at the time of departure. Id. When more than the 
predicted number of passengers show at the airport, there are not enough seats and some are 
forced to wait for the next flight. Id. Bumped passengers can be entitled to monetary 
compensation depending on the length of travel delay. Id. Involuntarily bumped passengers 
who receive substitute transportation scheduled to arrive at their final destination ―within one 
hour of [their] original scheduled arrival time[s] [receive] no compensation.‖ Id. Substitute 
transportation that schedules passengers to arrive at their final destination between one and two 
hours of the original arrival time entitles the travelers to the cost of their one-way fares up to 
$400. Id. ―If the substitute transportation is scheduled to get [passengers] to [their] 
destination[s] more than two hours later . . . , or if the airline does not make any substitute travel 
arrangements . . . , the compensation doubles (200% of [the] fare[s], $800 maximum).‖ Id. 
Passengers on cancelled flights face difficulties when trying to find alternative transportation 
because airlines are operating flights filled closer to capacity. JOSHUA MARKS & DARRYL 
JENKINS, MODELING PASSENGER REACCOMMODATION TIME FOR FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS IN 
AIRLINE NETWORKS 5 (2010), available at http://www.marksaviation.com/MarksAviation/ 
Tarmac_files/Passenger%20Displacement%20Paper.pdf. Under the CAB Rule 240, airlines 
were required ―to offer passengers on cancelled flights the first available seat on either that 
airline‘s own flight, or on the first available flight of a competing airline.‖ Id. at 1–2. 
Deregulation ended the mandated rebooking on other airlines, but carriers continued the 
practice until financial troubles led to cutting the costly procedure. Id. at 2. Passengers must 
instead wait longer to be reaccommodated on their original airline. Id. at 6. These factors help 
lead to Marks and Jenkins‘ conclusion ―that cancellations create significantly more harm to 
passengers than delays.‖ Id. at 1. 
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C. Failed Legislative Remedies 
The DOT regulation and proposed APBR come after a series of 
failed federal statutes designed to protect airline passengers from 
extended delays and other common problems.
91
 The first attempts at 
passenger protection were acts proposed in the late 1980s.
92
 Early 
legislation sought to provide consumers with information about 
dispute resolution and on-time performance records.
93
 One failed 
attempt, the Airline Reregulation Act of 1989 (ARA),
94
 called for 
disclosing carriers‘ on-time performance,95 controlling 
advertisements,
96
 and preventing carriers from cancelling flights on 
short notice for economic reasons.
97
 Later proposals demanded better 
on-time performance on regularly scheduled routes.
98
 With hub 
development, lawmakers became concerned about the number of 
passengers missing connections.
99
 To combat delays, legislation 
sought airport pricing schemes that discouraged carriers from 
scheduling flights during peak periods.
100
 None of the proposals 
 
 91. See Timothy M. Ravich, Re-regulation and Airline Passengers’ Rights, 67 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 935, 939–52 (2002). 
 92. Id. at 941. 
 93. Id. at 942. 
 94. S. 1854, 101st Cong. (1989). Senator Byrd, in discussing the proposed bill, noted that 
if he could recast his vote on the ADA, he ―would now vote against deregulation.‖ 135 CONG. 
REC. 27,898 (1989) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd). The 1989 legislation proposed the creation 
of an Aviation Policy Board to improve air service by regulating fares and air routes. S. 1854 
§§ 102, 106–07. 
 95. Carriers were to include information on ticket jackets, directing customers to on-time 
performance records through travel agents or the airline‘s reservation office. S. 1854 § 201. 
 96. The bill would have prohibited airlines ―from advertising a fare for any flight at a 
particular price, unless the air carrier offer[ed] at least one-third of the seats for‖ that price, 
without a disclosure stating otherwise. Id. 
 97. Airlines could cancel flights for profitability concerns only if passengers were given a 
day‘s notice and properly accommodated on another flight. Id. 
 98. Airline Passengers Defense Act of 1990, H.R. 5453, 101st Cong. § 1703 (1990) (―The 
on-time performance of any regularly scheduled flight of an air carrier may not be 30 percent or 
less in any consecutive 3-month period.‖). 
 99. Airline Competition and Passenger Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 2037, 102d Cong. 
§ 1701 (1991). 
 100. ―[A]n airport may impose and collect a higher fee for landing an aircraft during a peak 
hour for air traffic at the airport for the purpose of reducing delays and congestion at the 
airport.‖ Id. § 1703.  
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passed, but the DOT responded by compiling records of lost baggage 
and on-time performance.
101
 
Delays continued to be a problem, culminating in the 
unprecedented January 1999 stranding of hundreds of passengers in 
Detroit.
102
 Again considering corrective legislation,
103
 Congress 
instead accepted the airlines‘ promises to improve conditions for 
passengers on delayed flights.
104
 The resulting Airline Customer 
Service Commitment (Commitment) of June 17, 1999, signed by the 
Air Transport Association (ATA) on behalf of fourteen of its member 
airlines, required that each carrier prepare a Customer Service Plan to 
implement policies for handling and communicating with delayed 
passengers.
105
 The Commitment required that carriers treat bumped 
passengers fairly, provide for ―customers‘ essential needs during long 
on-aircraft delays,‖ and notify passengers of delays, cancellations, 
and diversions.
106
  
 
 101. Ravich, supra note 91, at 941. The Airline Passenger Protection Act of 1987, which 
led to the current DOT reporting procedures, called for the Secretary of Transportation to 
compile and retain information regarding fares and frequency of service. H.R. 3051, 100th 
Cong. (1987). 
 102. DEP‘T OF TRANSP., REPORT ON THE JANUARY 1999 DETROIT SNOWSTORM (1999) 
[hereinafter 1999 REPORT], reprinted in Airline Passenger Rights, H.R. 700, H.R. 780, and H.R. 
908: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 
106th Cong. 320–60 (1999). Snow in excess of ten inches delayed an estimated 1200 
passengers on airplanes for more than eight hours. See id. at 4–7. 
 103. See Airline Passenger Bill of Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 700, 106th Cong. (1999); see 
also Passenger Entitlement and Competition Enhancement Act of 1999, H.R. 780, 106th Cong. 
(1999); Aviation Consumer Right to Know Act of 1999, H.R. 908, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 104. See Airline Customer Service Commitment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. 1–2 (2001) (statement of Hon. Kenneth Mead, 
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Transp.) [hereinafter Mead Statement], available at http://www. 
oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/cc2001090.pdf. The decision to allow airlines the 
opportunity to improve conditions without legislation was the result of Congressional hearings 
that culminated in an agreement between legislators, the DOT, and the ATA. Id. 
 105. Id. In signing the Commitment, the ATA represented Alaska, Aloha, American, ATA, 
America West, Continental, Delta, Hawaiian, Midwest Express, Northwest, Southwest, TWA, 
United, and US Airways. Id. at 2 n.3. 
 106. Id. at 2. The remaining provisions included requirements that airlines ―[o]ffer the 
lowest fare available,‖ provide ―[o]n-time baggage delivery‖ with ―an increase in the baggage 
liability limit‖ and ―[d]isclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer rules, and 
aircraft configuration[s].‖ Id. In following these procedures, the carriers were expected to ―[b]e 
more responsive to customer complaints.‖ Id.  
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The DOT conducted observations following the voluntarily 
enacted plan and found room for improvements.
107
 Airlines had made 
some provisions for customers on tarmac delays, but each carrier 
differed on the amount of time considered to be an ―extended‖ delay 
worthy of accommodations like food and beverages.
108
 Passengers, 
the report concluded, could be better informed of their rights if 
airlines were to ―establish in the Commitment and their Customer 
Service Plans targets for reducing the number of chronically delayed‖ 
flights.
109
  
Congress proceeded with legislation ―to establish consumer 
protections for airline passengers‖ with the May 2001 introduction of 
the Airline Passenger Bill of Rights.
110
 The bill would have required 
airlines to develop plans for delay situations.
111
 In the case of delays, 
cancellations, or diversions, honest announcements were to inform 
passengers about the reasons for the schedule changes.
112
 Passengers 
experiencing tarmac delays were to be provided ―access to necessary 
services and conditions, including food, water, [and] restroom 
facilities.‖113 The bill included a variety of factors that could result in 
the deplanement of passengers.
114
 Four months after the act‘s 
 
 107. Id. at 5. Airlines were encouraged to increase the compensation for bumped 
passengers, which had not changed since 1978. Id. at 19. 
 108. Id. at 9. The shortest period counted as an extended delay by an airline was forty-five 
minutes. Id. Other carriers set the extended delay time at three hours. Id. Requesting 
clarification, the DOT noted, ―it is unlikely that a passenger‘s definition of an ‗extended‘ on-
aircraft delay will vary depending upon which air carrier they are flying.‖ Id. 
 109. Id. at 16. 
 110. H.R. 1734, 107th Cong. (2001). The legislation was introduced in spite of ―evidence 
show[ing] significant investment and progress by the Airlines toward meeting these 
Commitment provisions.‖ Mead Statement, supra note 104, at 8. 
 111. H.R. 1734. The 2001 bill required that passengers bumped from flights receive 
alternate transportation, as well as compensation for food and hotel costs if the trip could not be 
completed within the same day. Id. § 41,722. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. The bill required: 
No air carrier . . . shall prevent or hinder . . . any passenger from exiting the aircraft . . . 
if – 
(1) the aircraft is parked at an airport terminal gate with access to ramp or other 
facilities through which passengers are customarily boarded and deplaned; 
(2) the aircraft has remained at the gate more than 1 hour past its scheduled departure 
time; and 
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introduction, on September 11, terrorists hijacked and crashed four 
airplanes.
115
 Passenger levels dropped, and concerns about delays 
were subordinated to security interests.
116
 
By 2007, passenger traffic had returned to pre-September 11 
levels.
117
 In the wake of highly publicized delays at Kennedy 
International and LaGuardia airports, the New York legislature 
passed the state‘s Passenger Bill of Rights.118 The law required 
carriers to provide food, water, clean lavatories, and electrical power 
to passengers during ground delays in excess of three hours.
119
 The 
statute, however, only applied to flights delayed prior to departure 
and not to passengers stranded on arrival.
120
 The ATA, the airline 
industry‘s trade organization, challenged the law in Air Transport 
Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Cuomo (ATA).121 The ATA court determined 
that the ADA‘s explicit reference to ―services‖ preempted the state 
law requiring carriers to provide food and facilities for passengers.
122
 
 
(3) the captain of the aircraft has not been informed by air traffic control authorities 
that the aircraft can be cleared for departure within 30 minutes. 
Id. 
 115. David M. Kennedy, Op-Ed., Fighting an Elusive Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, 
at A31. 
 116. Jonathan E. DeMay, Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 131, 
315 (2008). 
 117. Id. 
 118. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 251(f)–(j) (McKinney 2008). Particularly troubling was the 
February 2007 stranding of more than a thousand JetBlue passengers for up to ten hours during 
an ice storm. Thomas Frank & Andrea Stone, Fliers’ Misery Stings JetBlue, USA TODAY, Feb. 
16, 2007, at A5.  
 119. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 251(g). The controversial portions of the statute required ―that 
passengers are provided as needed with: (a) electric generation service to provide temporary 
power for fresh air and lights; (b) waste removal service in order to service the holding tanks for 
on-board restrooms; and (c) adequate food and drinking water and other refreshment.‖ Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 520 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2008). The district court upheld New York‘s statute as 
―[un]related to a price, route, or service.‖ Air Transp. Ass‘n of Am. v. Cuomo, 528 F. Supp. 2d 
62, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 122. ATA, 520 F.3d at 223–25. In reviewing the district court, the Second Circuit found that 
the term ―service‖ in the ADA restricts what states can require of carriers during ground delays. 
Id. at 223. The ADA requires that states not ―enact or enforce any . . . provision having the 
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier‖ providing 
interstate travel. ADA, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1708 (1978) (emphasis added) 
(amending various portions of 49 U.S.C.). The ATA court held that ―[r]equiring airlines to 
provide food, water, electricity, and restrooms to passengers during lengthy ground delays does 
relate to the service of an air carrier and therefore falls within the express terms of the ADA‘s 
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Congress, like the New York legislature, became concerned over 
lengthy delays in 2007.
123
 The Senate and House of Representatives 
introduced legislation known as the Airline Passenger Bill of Rights 
Act of 2007.
124
 The Senate focused on departure delays while the 
House extended passenger protections to include those stranded on 
arrival.
125
 The longer House proposal also established requirements 
for disclosure and publication of chronically delayed flights.
126
 The 
ATA decision and the death of both bills led to the new DOT 
regulation and APBR proposal. 
D. Proposed and Current Passenger Protections 
In January of 2009, a new APBR was introduced.
127
 During the 
following summer, delays, including the diversion of Continental 
Flight 2816, hastened support for passing the legislation.
128
 The 
APBR of 2009 inclusively defines ―tarmac delay[s]‖ as occurring 
both before takeoff and after landing.
129
 The bill establishes a 
supervisory role for the Secretary of Transportation in setting 
 
preemption provision.‖ 520 F.3d at 223. Any safety concerns the New York statute purportedly 
addressed as part of the state‘s police powers were preempted by the ADA and its regulations. 
Id. The ATA decision frustrated other states‘ efforts similar to the statute struck down in New 
York. See Frank Ahrens, Court Rejects Air Travelers Bill of Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 
2008, at D3. New York was the first of at least ten states considering laws regarding airline 
delays to pass the legislation. Id. 
 123. 153 CONG. REC. 2204 (2007) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer). Along with JetBlue, 
American Airlines faced delays in 2007, with one boarded plane sitting nine hours without 
adequate food, water, or lavatories. Id. 
 124. S. 678, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1303, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 125. See S. 678 (―In any case in which departure of a flight of an air carrier is delayed, such 
air carrier shall provide (A) adequate food and potable water to passengers on such flight during 
such delay; and (B) adequate restroom facilities to passengers on such flight during such 
delay.‖); H.R. 1303 (―A covered air carrier . . . shall provide for the essential needs of 
passengers at all times during which the aircraft is on the ground in the event of a departure or 
arrival delay . . . .‖). The primary distinction would have been the opportunity for arriving 
passengers, under the House‘s wording, to deplane after three hours. See H.R. 1303. If the 
Senate bill became law, arriving passengers would have remained unprotected from the long 
tarmac delays that later plagued Flight 2816. See S. 678. 
 126. H.R. 1303. 
 127. S. 213, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 128. See Merchant, supra note 2. 
 129. S. 213 § 2. Flights do not need to be delayed at a scheduled arrival or departure 
location as the law ―applies to aircraft without regard to whether they have been diverted to an 
airport other than the original destination.‖ Id. 
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minimum standards for airline and airport delay planning.
130
 These 
standards include a requirement that carriers provide food, water, 
lavatories, a comfortable cabin environment, and medical treatment 
to passengers.
131
 Travelers must also be given an opportunity to 
deplane during prolonged delays every three hours.
132
 Pilots, 
however, may override the deplaning provision when they have a 
reasonable belief that the aircraft will depart within thirty minutes or 
if deplaning would jeopardize safety or security.
133
 The APBR creates 
civil penalties for those airlines that fail to comply.
134
 
The APBR is not limited to carriers. Airports also must submit 
plans and make gates available for delayed aircraft.
135
 They are 
required to provide deplaning options for passengers during long 
delays.
136
 In addition, airports may need to encourage airlines to share 
gates.
137
 
Acting independently from APBR proponents, the DOT also 
recognized the problems of delayed flights and sought the advice of 
industry insiders and the traveling public.
138
 As a result, the DOT set 
the limit on tarmac delays at three hours and applied it to major and 
regional airlines.
139
 Each carrier is expected to draft and follow a 
contingency plan and, in the case of regional airlines operating under 
a code-share agreement for a major airline, apply the plan most 
beneficial to passengers.
140
 International flights are exempt from the 
three-hour limits, however, because the DOT believed their 
cancellation would pose greater hardship to passengers than lengthy 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. Types of civil penalties, however, are unspecified. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. To avoid penalties, both airports and carriers must ―obtain approval of, or adhere to a 
contingency plan‖ submitted in accordance with the APBR. Id.  
 137. See id. 
 138. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,233 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
The DOT collectively received two hundred responses from airlines, trade associations, 
consumers, and congressional representatives. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 
Fed. Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 30, 2009). 
 139. Enhanced Protections for Airline Passengers, 14 C.F.R. §§ 259.3–259.4 (2010). The 
three-hour limit applies regardless of whether the delay occurs on departure or arrival. Id. 
§ 259.4. 
 140. Id. § 259.4; 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,985. 
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delays.
141
 The DOT regulation is enforced by the imposition of 
penalties, including fining offenders up to $27,500 for each 
passenger.
142
 The agency, however, turned down proposals requiring 
contingency plans to appear in an airline‘s contract of carriage, 
thereby denying private causes of action.
143
 Initial results from the 
DOT regulation appear mixed, but the goal of reduced delays has 
been achieved.
144
 
II. ANALYSIS 
The need for government intervention to protect passenger rights 
is partially addressed by the new DOT regulation. Beginning April 
29, 2010, airlines were required to provide services for passengers on 
ground delays within two hours and deplane them on delays lasting 
longer than three hours.
145
 The DOT regulation, however, should 
serve as just the beginning of governing passenger rights and 
protections. Congressional leaders pushing for the APBR argue that a 
 
 141. 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,985. International flights are not permitted unlimited delays, but the 
carriers may set their own duration when developing contingency plans. 14 C.F.R. § 259.4. The 
DOT hypothesizes that cancellation of these less frequent flights may cause ―greater harm to 
consumers who are less likely to be accommodated on an alternate flight in a reasonable period 
of time.‖ 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,988. The new regulation similarly does not require the reporting of 
delayed international flights out of concern that it ―could make carriers less inclined to hold 
flights for‖ late connecting travelers. Id. at 68,983. 
 142. 14 C.F.R. § 259.4; JOSHUA MARKS & DARRYL JENKINS, IMPACT OF THREE-HOUR 
TARMAC DELAY RULES AND FINES ON PASSENGER TRAVEL TIME AND WELFARE 16 (2010), 
available at http://www.tarmaclimits.com/tarmac/tarmac_Limits_files/Tarmac_Paper.pdf.  
 143. 14 C.F.R. § 259.4; 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,988–89.  
 144. In May 2009, there were thirty-four flights with tarmac delays of at least three hours. 
Research & Innovative Tech. Admin., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Table 2 Monthly Summary 
of Tarmac Times, Oct. 2008–Oct. 2010, BTS.GOV, http://www.bts.gov/programs/airline_ 
information/taxi_out_and_other_tarmac_times/table_02.html (last visited May 12, 2011). In 
May 2010, however, only one flight suffered a three-hour delay. Id. Although the results appear 
promising, flight cancellations rose 40 percent from 2009 to 2010. MARKS & JENKINS, supra 
note 142, at 60. Direct cancellations resulting from the rule could reach 2,600 annual flights, 
displacing approximately 203,000 passengers. Id. at 51. Numbers might be even higher when 
non-delayed flights later in the day are indirectly cancelled for lack of aircraft or crew. Id. at 
51–52. All displaced passengers must wait for the sparse open seats on later flights—as much 
as ―21 or more hours‖ after their scheduled departure as compared to the ―average 2.7 hours of 
incremental tarmac time.‖ Id. at 51. Carriers, leery of fines between 200 and 300 times 
passenger revenue, have encouraged ―flights returning to the gate [and] a higher cancellation 
percentage as airlines free gates for passenger disembarkation.‖ Id. at 2. 
 145. 14 C.F.R. § 259.4.  
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statute would provide passengers with more permanent protections 
from the powerful airline industry.
146
 While a developed statutory and 
regulatory scheme is needed, the form passenger protections take 
should be carefully considered. 
Passengers should not suffer decreased rights on domestic flights 
merely because a major airline has elected to use regional carriers in 
some markets. Including regional airlines in the DOT regulation was 
an important step in preventing dissimilar treatment.
147
 The shift from 
only flying large jets to using regional airplanes means that any 
effective protection for passengers must also apply to these smaller 
aircraft.
148
 The DOT regulation properly requires all airlines to file 
contingency plans.
149
 When a major airline and its regional carrier 
have conflicting plans, the plan most advantageous to passengers 
must be applied.
150
  
The new DOT regulation implements essential protections, but its 
nuances leave many passengers unprotected and may cause additional 
harm to others. For example, the DOT treats flights differently if they 
leave the country.
151
 The deplaning requirements applied to domestic 
trips offer no protection for international travelers.
152
 Passengers wish 
to avoid cancellations, especially those on infrequent flights leaving 
the United States. The DOT regulation, however, fails to provide any 
limitation on the tarmac delays international travelers may endure.
153
 
The rationale of preventing departure cancellations does not explain 
the lack of regulation for flights arriving in the United States.
154
 
 
 146. Press Release, Sen. Barbara Boxer, Boxer, Snowe Praise DOT Action to Protect 
Passenger Rights (Dec. 21, 2009), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/ 
122109a.cfm. ―As good as this rule is, it doesn‘t give passengers permanent protection because 
it could be overturned by a future administration.‖ Id. 
 147. See 14 C.F.R. § 259.4. The DOT, over objections raised by carrier associations and 
ExpressJet, decided to apply the new restrictions to those airlines operating airplanes with thirty 
or more passenger seats. Id. § 259.2. Regional airlines sought to avoid the new regulation on the 
basis that their contracts with major airlines governed responses to delays. 74 Fed. Reg. at 
68,984. The requirement that regional airlines develop contingency plans could lead to conflicts 
when they differ from those created by their larger code-share partners. Id. 
 148. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 149. 14 C.F.R. § 259.4.  
 150. 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,985. 
 151. See 14 C.F.R. § 259.4. 
 152. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 153. 14 C.F.R. § 259.4. 
 154. The passengers on Virgin Atlantic Flight VS001 did not suffer a flight cancellation by 
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Recognizing their greater capacity to care for passengers, the 
conditions on even the largest aircraft used to span continents can 
devolve to the levels of cramped, regional jets during long delays.
155
  
The DOT regulation expands protections guaranteed by the 
government‘s ability to impose fines, but it fails to provide a private 
cause of action for stranded passengers.
156
 Airlines are not required to 
publish their contingency plans in their contracts of carriage.
157
 By 
not mandating provisions for redressing passenger injuries, the 
regulation limits the potential for breach of contract suits to those 
airlines that voluntarily incorporate plans into their contracts.
158
 The 
regulation instead provides a method of complaining through the 
offending airline itself.
159
 Such a limited option inhibits consumer 
involvement in policing the aviation industry and provides few 
incentives to draft complaints. 
Supporters of the APBR recognize the achievement of the DOT 
regulation, but also believe that a more permanent statute is 
necessary.
160
 Airlines and their representatives at the ATA are 
politically powerful and have extensive legal resources.
161
 Without 
legislative action like the APBR, a future administration would find it 
easier to deregulate.
162
 Voters and passengers could hold politicians 
directly accountable if legislative attempts were made to decrease 
 
deplaning at Bradley International. See Sharkey, supra note 26. They had already made the 
flight and arrived in the United States, albeit not in the intended destination of New York. See 
id. Applying the deplaning requirements to international arrivals does not mean passengers are 
stranded because additional flights or alternative transportation could be provided. See id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983, 68,988–89 (Dec. 30, 
2009). 
 157. Id. at 68,989. The DOT strongly ―encourage[s airlines] to include their contingency 
plans in their contracts of carriage‖ and ―will publicize a list of carriers that do and do not so 
incorporate their plans.‖ Id. 
 158. 14 C.F.R. § 259.6. The DOT continues to consider whether plans will eventually be 
required to be part of contracts of carriage. 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,989. 
 159. 14 C.F.R. § 259.7. 
 160. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 161. As demonstrated in the ATA case, the ATA is aggressive in attacking government 
actions that impose upon the airline industry. Air Transp. Ass‘n of Am. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 
218, 218 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 162. The DOT could conduct notice and comment and repeal the rule, offering an 
explanation of the policy goals that eliminating the regulation served. Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006). 
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passenger protections.
163
 It would be comparably difficult to alter 
actions of the DOT.
164
 Lacking a comprehensive statute also means 
that agency regulating power is not being used to fully reduce long 
delays. The FAA‘s slot control mechanism, for example, is not 
addressed in the DOT regulation or the proposed APBR.
165
 
The DOT regulation and proposed APBR have limited goals of 
addressing the effects of delays but may actually cause additional 
problems.
166
 The strict penalties imposed under the DOT regulation 
risk exacerbating the detriment to delayed passengers by causing 
flight cancellations.
167
 The best form of protection would be avoiding 
delays rather than minimizing their effects. Airlines, however, make 
prevention difficult by squeezing more flights into shorter time 
periods.
168
 
III. PROPOSAL 
The DOT regulation surpasses prior attempts to limit passenger 
tarmac delays.
169
 The proposed APBR similarly offers more robust, 
albeit less specific, statutory protection in an area where previous 
legislation has failed.
170
 Both the regulation and bill, however, should 
serve only as the beginning of passenger rights improvements. 
A comprehensive plan is necessary to establish statutory rights 
that can be refined by regulations. Such a plan should provide for 
 
 163. Senators stand for election every six years. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Representatives 
stand for election every two years. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.  
 164. Agency officials are not directly accountable to voters. They are, however, mindful of 
public opinion and must ―respond to significant points made during the public comment 
period.‖ Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 527 
(1985); see MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 
(3d ed. 2009). Passengers also could challenge repeal of the regulation in court, the same as 
with the creation of a rule. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of the United States v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The agency action would be evaluated under the 
―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard, but this review is ―narrow.‖ Id. at 42–43.  
 165. See S. 213, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 624, 111th Cong. (2009); Enhanced Protections 
for Airline Passengers, 14 C.F.R. § 259 (2010). 
 166. The new regulation seeks to prevent airlines from operating ―consistently delayed 
flights.‖ See supra note 98. 
 167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  
 168. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra Part I.C. 
 170. See supra Part I.C. 
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deplaning passengers based on the size of aircraft and their ability to 
hold passengers in relative comfort.
171
 The DOT regulation arguably 
offers a similar provision by not restricting international flights.
172
 
The virtual exclusion of deplaning requirements, however, does a 
disservice to consumers because even large aircraft are unable to 
provide indefinite comfort.
173
 Future regulations should apply equally 
to international flights and foreign carriers. At the least, international 
arrivals or foreign flights diverted to American airports should be 
included in the deplaning requirements.
174
 While time limits for 
international departures might cause cancellations or inhibit carriers 
from holding flights for connecting passengers, the application of 
deplaning requirements to international arrivals poses no similar 
problems.
175
 
Generally, larger airplanes are more capable of storing the 
supplies needed during long tarmac delays.
176
 Bigger aircraft with 
higher passenger loads also require significantly more time to 
deplane in comparison with their smaller counterparts.
177
 If flights are 
not cancelled, reboarding all the passengers will further delay 
departures, leading to missed connections and upset customers. 
Regional jets, like those operated by ExpressJet, might be strictly 
limited on delays, perhaps to an even shorter time than the three 
hours now permitted.
178
 Depending on the rationale—time to deplane 
or capable facilities—larger aircraft might be granted longer delay 
periods.
179
 A general approach that divides airplanes into small, 
 
 171. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 174. Virgin Flight VS001 demonstrated the potential hazards that delays pose to 
international travel. See Sharkey, supra note 26. 
 175. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 176. The DOT cites passenger expectations on long, international flights as a reason for 
permitting airlines to set longer delays. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 
68,983, 68,988 (Dec. 30, 2009). The same rationale exists for long, domestic flights. 
 177. Both the Embraer 145 and Boeing 777 use a single door for deplaning, but the 777 
holds approximately six times as many passengers. See EMBRAER, supra note 4, at 7; see also 
B777-200, supra note 83. In the event of cancellation, deplaning more passengers also 
necessitates the unloading of more bags. 
 178. See supra note 83. 
 179. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. While the international configuration might 
provide greater facilities for stranded passengers, the higher density of travelers on the domestic 
configuration will take longer to deplane and reboard. For example, a United 777 has 253 
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medium, and large capacities will avoid unnecessary confusion that 
would result from arbitrarily grouping aircraft by destination or 
accommodations aboard. Deplaning requirements must be 
communicated to customers prior to boarding so expectations are 
clear. 
Furthermore, future statutes and regulations should require 
airlines to include delay limits and procedures in their contracts of 
carriage.
180
 By establishing a civil claim for breach of contract, the 
DOT would empower passengers to recoup damages when airlines 
violate delay limits.
181
 A delayed flight may mean a cancelled 
business meeting, a missed wedding, or a lost day in Disney World. 
Consumers justifiably believe their time is valuable. They want and 
deserve the opportunity to seek redress. As the regulation currently 
reads, passengers benefit from the DOT‘s severe fines only as much 
as they prefer the risk of cancellations over delays.
182
 The fines 
should be reduced to more reasonably reflect the severity of violating 
the regulation.
183
 A fine structure or civil damages alternative that 
more closely reflects fares and revenues would reduce the chance of 
needless deplaning and cancellations.
184
  
Flight 2816 demonstrated the importance of airport cooperation in 
deplaning delayed passengers.
185
 Any statute or regulation seeking to 
decrease delays should require contingency plans for airports and 
airport service providers in addition to airlines.
186
 In many of the 
delay situations caused by extreme weather, thousands of passengers 
can be stranded in aircraft scattered around an airport‘s tarmac.187 
 
passenger seats in its international version and 348 in the domestic model. B777-200, supra 
note 83. 
 180. See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text (The DOT has not yet required 
airlines to include plans in contracts of carriage.). 
 181. See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 183. Fines of $27,500 per passenger equate to a $1.4 million penalty for a full, fifty-seat 
regional aircraft like Continental Express Flight 2816. MARKS & JENKINS, supra note 142, at 1. 
 184. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra note 13. 
 186. The APBR includes a basic requirement that airport operators cooperate in the 
deplanement of passengers. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. At airports that are 
already overcrowded, finding empty gates to deplane becomes more difficult. 
 187. The delays of February 2007 provide an example. See supra note 118 and 
accompanying text. 
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Rather than attempting to set unrealistic time limits that depend on 
the actions of carriers, all airports should restrict the number of 
airplanes they serve at a given time to those that they can 
accommodate realistically. 
The limit on aircraft numbers would work best if it was divided 
into two categories. First, slot controls, a restriction that already 
exists, can decrease the number of aircraft attempting to arrive or 
depart at a given airport.
188
 The number of slots at busy airports must 
be decreased and applied in shorter increments to more evenly 
distribute flights throughout the day.
189
 Departing flights should no 
longer be scheduled at overlapping times.
190
 Having fewer aircraft 
waiting in line for take-off will minimize the number of passengers 
stranded on the tarmac when delays occur. By limiting the size of 
aircraft waves, airports can decrease many of the more common, 
shorter delays.
191
 
Second, the maximum number of airplanes an airport can serve at 
a given time should be more tightly regulated.
192
 Determining the 
exact number of aircraft permitted should be based on factors that 
include the number of gates and likelihood of extensive delays. While 
the FAA and DOT might provide guidance, each airport has different 
needs based on terminal configuration, weather patterns, passenger 
usage, and the types of aircraft served. Airport operators should 
evaluate these considerations in drafting plans for agency approval.
193
 
Any such restrictions, however, need to leave room for safety 
 
 188. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 192. ―Serving,‖ as opposed to general capacity, should be used to exclude from the 
restrictions those airplanes that are parked at the airport for storage or maintenance. The 
narrowing of the calculation to only reflect commercial passenger aircraft is significant in that 
the primary purpose of airport capacity restrictions would be to make gates available for the 
easy deplaning of delayed passengers. See BAZARGAN, supra note 66, at 132–33 (discussing 
complexity of gate assignments). Private and cargo flights that must be included when 
calculating arrival and departure limits do not use the terminal gates for airlines and should be 
excluded from the number an airport can serve. 
 193. Arguably, airports already recognize the limits to their serving capacity, but 
restrictions remain unenforceable without the risk of penalties. See supra note 86 and 
accompanying text. 
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considerations such as diversions or emergency landings that would 
increase the number of aircraft to an otherwise unacceptable level.  
Carriers will change their behavior in response to airport 
restrictions.
194
 Infrequent flights on high-capacity aircraft will replace 
frequent services on regional airplanes.
195
 Connections via hubs to 
some city pairings may become unavailable during some complexes. 
Passengers must exchange these conveniences to minimize delays, 
but cancelling scheduled flights should not be the primary 
response.
196
 A better remedy presupposes that delays will occur and 
prepares carriers and airports to handle disruptions with fewer 
scheduled flights. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent DOT regulation protecting delayed passengers offers 
hope that Flight 2816 will remain a horror story of the past and not a 
fear that follows travelers down every jetbridge. Government 
regulation in the early twentieth century protected the airline industry 
from its own competitive forces. Now regulation is needed to protect 
consumers from delays in the modern, complex market of air travel. 
Legislation and regulations must address both the effects of delays 
that passengers experience and the causes of late flights. 
Aviation in the United States was forever changed by deregulation 
in the 1970s and the tragedies of September 11, 2001. The once 
glamorous industry has lost its charm: aviation has become an option 
for the average traveler through greater competition, reduced fares, 
and more flights. Today‘s passengers will never experience the 
freedom of flight enjoyed by the Lindberghs. The ―adventure‖ of 
aviation, however, does not need to be the prospect of interminable 
delays if Congress and the DOT continue to advance passenger rights 
and protections. 
 
 194. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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